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Miami, Florida 
Professor Steven Blevins, Major Professor 
 The purpose of this thesis was to contribute to a dialogue that considers the 
relationship between history, literature, and empathy as a literary affect. Specifically, I 
explored sites of literature’s transformative potential as it relates to cultural studies and 
the ethics of deconstruction. Via a deconstructive, post-colonial reading of Toni 
Morrison’s Beloved and Junot Díaz’s The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao, I 
considered how subjects in our current socio-political moment can feel history.  
 Emerging from a post-structurally mediated engagement with history, 
signification, and feeling, I argued that empathy, as it is contentiously presented in the 
context of deconstruction, is not necessarily a reductive or essentialist approach towards 
relating or “being-with” an-other. Instead, I proposed that the act of reading 
historiographical novels that take constructions of the Atlantic Slave Trade to task might 
generate an affective empathy, which could in turn engender a more empathetic 
relationality and way of being-in-the-world.  
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Taking Issue With History: Empathy and the Ethical Imperatives of Creative 
Interventions 
 
 
Part 1. The Ethics of Interrogation: Affect, Empathy, History 
 
“Fictional world-making is only ever as effective as the participatory reader makes it, through 
active cocreation. The capacity of human beings to engage intellectually and emotionally with 
imaginary worlds and their denizens places narrative empathy at the intersection of aesthetics, 
psychology, and philosophy.” 
-Suzanne Keen, Empathy and the Novel 
 
 The purpose of this project is to present a reading of Toni Morrison’s Beloved and 
Junot Díaz’s The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao that frames these texts as exemplary 
creative interventions with the potential for motivating an affective empathy.1
                                                        1 In Empathy and the Novel, Suzanne Keen “affirms the robustness of narrative empathy, as an affective 
transaction accomplished through the writing and reading of fiction, but [she] hesitate[s] to tether readers’ 
empathy to certain outcomes of altruistic action” (xv). Keen’s analysis is thorough and comprehensive, but 
ultimately finds little evidence to indicate a causal link between narrative empathy and altruism. I argue, 
however, that empathy is something different from what Keen understands as empathy, especially in 
relation to historiographical novels that engage the trauma of the Atlantic Slave Trade.  
 Empathy, 
then, becomes a way to feel history by way of Nancian singular plurality & being-with, 
thus inaugurating subjectivities that might begin to take issue with the problem of history 
and historiography regarding the trans-Atlantic Slave Trade. Arguably, by approaching 
history through the lens of affective empathy, the inaugurated subject has the potential to 
engage in a more ethical way of being-in-the-world. Ideally, this project will help address 
the anxieties surrounding the construction of a history that accounts for the realities of the 
Atlantic Slave Trade and its aftermath by considering the intersection of empathy, ethics, 
and history. “Realities,” here, not only refers to the “factual” events that led to the 
capturing and transporting of enslaved Africans to the New World, but also to one of the 
problems produced by this violent transition: the issue of engaging and understanding the 
lived experiences of the black women and men whose identities were “written” by the 
 2 
Colonizers in documents that have often been construed as “official” historical accounts. 
The fact that our current geo-political and socio-cultural conditions are mediated, not 
only by the event of enslavement, but also by accounts of enslavement, means we must 
consider the ways in which it becomes possible to intervene upon histories constructed in 
ways that perpetuate an epistemology of binary thinking and hierarchical relationality.   
 In order to begin questioning ways to intervene upon the archives of history, it is 
useful to consider how Saidiya Hartman’s provocative essay, “Venus in Two Acts,” 
negotiates the demand to historicize with the ethical problems she finds in the act of 
historicizing. In January of 2008, Hartman’s Lose Your Mother was released to critical 
acclaim. As The New York Times notes, “Hartman’s main focus in Lose Your Mother is 
shaking up our abstract, and therefore forgettable, appreciation for a tragedy wrought on 
countless nameless, faceless Africans” (Schmidt). Achieving her purpose, though, proves 
difficult for Hartman because of “the huge gaps she encounters in her archival work” 
(Schmidt). Similarly, in “Venus in Two Acts” (published in June of 2008), Hartman 
reflects on her own practice of historicizing, and its failure to achieve the recuperative 
ends she hoped would free Venus from “the banal chronicles” of history (3). Hartman 
struggles with the notion that Venus’s story is an “untimely” one “told by a failed 
witness” and is compelled to “tell a story” that helps fill the void left by the Western 
understanding of the enslaved as entirely dejected victims (2). For Hartman then, it is 
paramount not only to locate sites in the archive where the autonomy of the enslaved was 
depicted, but also to take on the task of writing enslaved bodies as agents. To do so, 
however, would be to impose the breath of life on a consciousness and experience that 
cannot be known. In other words, for Hartman, the act of reanimating Venus’s historical 
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presence would require her to enact the same violence that was forced upon Venus in the 
first place, because it would do the work of consolation. Hartman’s issue with this kind of 
personal consolation is that it turns Venus into another kind of instrument or tool with 
which to soothe the aches of enslavement’s trauma. It is the problem of reanimating 
Venus on the same terms that determined her economic value, which serves as the crux to 
Hartman’s exploration of the potential redemptive power of a creative intervention. She 
asks, “Is it possible to construct a story from ‘the locus of impossible speech’ or resurrect 
lives from the ruins? Can beauty provide an antidote to dishonor, and love a way to 
‘exhume buried cries’ and reanimate the dead?” (3). Although Hartman recognizes the 
impossibility of engaging with a cohesive and complete understanding of the lives of 
enslaved Africans, she is not content to leave it at that. Why then does Hartman end her 
trajectory by not writing Venus? She says, 
My account replicates the very order of violence that it writes against by 
placing yet another demand upon the girl, by requiring that her life be 
made useful or instructive, by finding in it a lesson for our future or a hope 
for history (14). 
These demands highlight the economic rhetoric that marks Venus’s presence in the 
archive.  
Hartman ultimately decides that she cannot recover the story of Venus and ends 
her piece by underscoring the importance of recognizing that we cannot rescue the many 
Venuses from the violence that erased their voices from existing constructed histories. 
Nonetheless, it seems that - at the very least - we can attempt to understand history as we 
receive it with an awareness of the ways in which it excludes multiple perspectives and 
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“establishes who we are in relation to who we have been,” as well as question, challenge, 
and “interrogat[e] the production of our knowledge about the past” (Hartman 14). In fact, 
it is this manner of questioning that demonstrates the ethics of historicizing in Hartman’s 
piece. Hartman’s questioning and its attendant affective qualities help cultivate our own 
ethics of interrogation. Therefore, it would follow that as long as we self-consciously call 
attention to our recuperative attempts, to our struggle to understand the violence of 
slavery, and how that struggle requires creative interventions, we should poke, prod, and 
problematize the constructed histories that surround the Atlantic Slave Trade and its 
remnants in our sociocultural psyche. Further, because Hartman is “engendered” by 
history, this urge is a personal and seemingly ethical endeavor that would, ultimately, 
generate an imaginative space with the potential to intervene (4).  
 Hartman’s self-reflection is more explicitly rendered in terms of Beloved in 
Sharon Patricia Holland’s chapter entitled “Bakulu Discourse: Bodies Made ‘Flesh’ in 
Toni Morrison’s Beloved” when she says that “[t]he value of black femaleness…is 
intrinsically linked to her utilitarian purpose – her service to both the community and the 
academy. We make the experiences of other people more real to them” (Raising the 
Dead 42). The problems Holland finds in this construction of black femaleness, is that it 
reproduces the economic politics of enslavement by making black bodies tools with 
which to gain access to the million nameless lives of the enslaved. But does this problem 
mean that we should not attempt to access the narratives and experiences that are omitted 
from the archive? Or does this problem encourage us to figure out new avenues by which 
to access those omissions? Holland writes,  
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  Black female bodies serve as passage between humanity and nonhumanity 
  as well as the articulation of that passage…this border, which is no border  
  at all but a passageway, also encompasses the terrain between the living  
  and the dead, between the ancestral and the living community. (43) 
I suggest that the most ethical approach we can take to this problem is to engage the kind 
of telling that novels like Beloved and Brief Wondrous Life can provide in order to 
maneuver the difficult ethical concerns regarding the act of writing on behalf of the 
enslaved, and also about the ethical concerns in writing about the enslaved. These ethical 
concerns, though, should not preclude our attempts to better understand the horror of 
enslavement, but they do push us to identify the ethical approaches that may facilitate the 
experience. In this sense, Beloved and The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao, become 
the vehicles that can “formulate a new understanding of signs and signifiers and their 
literal…mean[ing] felt relationship to black women [and men]” (Holland 44).  
 While Hartman and Holland’s analyses of the discourses about enslavement and 
the historiography that constructs enslaved bodies based on terms of “value” and 
“usefulness” are extremely significant, it seems as though they further the silence of 
enslaved black women, and the recuperative attempts of those who want to reconfigure 
their presence in historical accounts. In fact, Hartman is paralyzed by these 
considerations. She writes; 
  But in the end I was forced to admit that I wanted to console myself and to  
escape the slave hold with a vision of something other than the bodies of 
two girls settling on the floor of the Atlantic (9). 
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The problem Hartman finds in her urge to recover Venus from the archive is that she is 
doing so in order to be consoled on an individual, and thus self-serving dimension. As 
Junot Díaz articulates in an interview with Yale Literary Magazine, “crying is something 
you do for yourself. Change is what you do for the collective” (30). If we understand 
Hartman’s desire to be consoled as the emotive result of losing something she desperately 
wants to recover (or something she never had), then consolation remains problematic. 
However, if we frame her desire to be consoled as something she can work through not 
only for herself, but for all of us, then her act of historicity holds incredible redemptive 
potential. Therefore, we will frame Hartman’s concerns in the context of the latter 
formulation, which then forces me to ask: what is wrong with wanting to be consoled? Is 
it not important to imagine enslaved subjects in the myriad directions they were sent in? 
Is it not our responsibility to understand that while many enslaved peoples were 
swallowed up by the Atlantic, there were many who reached the shores of the New 
World, and who had opportunities for agency and action despite the cruel, inhumane 
limits that colonization and the institution of enslavement imposed upon them? And 
because we are all engendered by history, and by the fissures that the Atlantic Slave 
Trade has left in our sociocultural modalities today, do we not have a right to be 
consoled? Furthermore, where does this urge to give voice to the absences in history 
come from? How are we, in our specific sociocultural moment in time, to fairly and 
ethically account for the erasures, reductions, and dangerous generalizations that mediate 
our understanding and engagement with enslaved subjects in a Western-sanctioned 
history?  
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The questions I have asked above are motivated by Hartman’s ethical 
interrogation of her relationship to the archive, but are also in dialogue with Hayden 
White’s perspective on the problem of historiography. White more closely attends to the 
ethics of interrogating the intersection of epistemological constructions, narrative, and 
history when he notes,  
 One of the ways that a scholarly field takes stock of itself is by   
  considering its history. Yet it is difficult to get an objective history of a  
  scholarly discipline because if the historian is himself a practitioner of it,  
  he is likely to be a devotee of one or another of its sects and hence biased;  
  and if he is not a practitioner, he is unlikely to have the expertise   
  necessary to distinguish between the significant and insignificant events of 
  the field’s development…One must try to get behind or beneath the  
  presuppositions which sustain a given type of inquiry and ask the   
  questions that can be begged in its practice in the interest of determining  
  why this type of inquiry has been designed to solve the problems it  
  characteristically tries to solve” (“The Historical Text as Literary   
  Artifact,” pp. 81, Tropics of Discourse).    
Like Hartman, White is calling for the kind of questioning that requires us to “get behind 
or beneath” history, which allows us to imagine how to intervene in ways that do not 
simply reproduce these discursive and economic relations. Through a mode that works 
with these subversions, and that ruptures into the historical archive, we are compelled 
toward sites that attempt to re-negotiate the lived experiences of the enslaved. 
Furthermore, White’s framing presupposes the aforementioned problems that are inherent 
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in academic or scholarly constructions of history, and identifies these sites as ones that 
need to be dismantled before we can even begin to arrive at the solutions they try to 
provide.  
 The issues of history’s more material consequences are evident in the way in 
which history constructs what Edouard Glissant refers to as the “collective 
consciousness” of Caribbean peoples in “The Quarrel with History” (61). Glissant argues 
that this collective consciousness is problematic precisely because it cannot exist insofar 
as it is mediated by the rupture between the lived experiences of those existing in the 
vestiges of slavery and colonization, and, the experiences of the colonizers who tell the 
story. According to Glissant,  
  the French Caribbean is the site of a history characterized by ruptures and  
  that began with a brutal dislocation, the slave trade. Our historical   
  consciousness could not be deposited gradually and continuously like  
  sediment, as it were, as happened with those peoples who have frequently  
  produced a totalitarian philosophy of history, for instance European  
  peoples, but came together in the context of shock, contraction, painful  
  negation, and explosive forces. This dislocation of the continuum, and the  
  inability of the collective consciousness to absorb it all, characterize what  
  I call a nonhistory. The negative effect of this nonhistory is therefore the  
  erasing of the collective memory…our history emerges at the edges of  
  what we can tolerate, this emergence must be related immediately to the  
  complicated web of events in our past. The past, to which we were   
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  subjected, which has not yet emerged as history for us, is, however,  
  obsessively present. (61-63) 
For Glissant, the most effective way to negotiate this problem of history is by challenging 
the epistemological models that produce our understanding of history and History itself. 
Glissant calls upon the power of myth to decenter Western “man” (read peoples) from 
“the center of things,” but more importantly, he points out that this decentering has to be 
acknowledged by Western “man” himself (74). He challenges the prioritization of 
“realism-objectivity” by proposing that “one might prefer the attempt to completely 
reconstruct (or to recreate) in depth one part of this reality” (74). Glissant attempts to 
negotiate the interstices of history and literature that situate a hierarchical understanding 
of “knowing” in opposition to a lived reality that is informed by an individual’s 
relationship to myth and stories. It is this challenging of established modes of what 
counts as knowledge, and its potential for decentering Western “man,” that seems to have 
redemptive power for Glissant, and thus, “makes a creative approach necessary” (62). In 
fact, Glissant notes, “What is repressed in our history persuades us, furthermore, that this 
is more than an intellectual game” (66). In other words, the urge to recuperate the aspects 
of history that are lost to us, is more than intellectually motivated, and is instead, driven 
by a need for consolation that is necessary collective insofar as  
  We are the roots of a cross-cultural relationship. Submarine roots: that is,  
  floating free, not fixed in one positions in some primordial spot, but  
  extending in all directions in our world through its network of branches.  
  (Glissant, 67)  
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The use of the pronoun “we,” underscores the importance of this project for all post-
colonial subjects, particularly if we consider that regardless of our current geographical 
location, socio-cultural and political conditions, we are all necessarily subjects of and 
subject to the demands of history, and are very closely mediated by the event of 
enslavement. Moreover, as we will later explore, the use of the pronoun “we” becomes 
the vehicle by which we can access the phenomenological being-with so central to Jean-
luc Nancy’s project. This recognition leads us to ask: how we can get at a poetics of 
feeling history?   
 I would suggest that Wilson Harris’s, “History, Fable and Myth in the Caribbean 
and Guianas” (1999) helps answer the above question and attempts to “clear the kind of 
historical stasis which has afflicted the Caribbean” by considering “perspectives of 
renascence which can bring into play a figurative meaning beyond an apparently real 
world or prison of history” (Selected Essays of Wilson Harris, 152, 156). By way of the 
limbo dance, a re-articulation of an African myth, Harris exemplifies the physical and 
historical ruptures that Glissant articulates, and gestures towards the notion of a collective 
consciousness when he says,  
  In fact here, I feel, we begin to put our finger on something which is close  
  to the inner universality of Caribbean man. Those waves of migration  
  which have hit the shores of the Americas – North, Central and South –  
  century after century have, at various times, possessed the stamp of the  
  spider metamorphosis, in the refugee flying from Europe or in the   
  indentured East Indian and Chinese from Asia (157). 
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Here, Harris supports my point that the trans-Atlantic Slave Trade has, in some way or 
another, determined the current conditions of “post-colonial” subjects in a global sense, 
based on the “inner universality of Caribbean man.” That is not to say that all Caribbean 
people share the same traits, but rather that Caribbean “man” and peoples of the 
Americas, and Europe, East India, Asia, etc., all “possess the stamp of the spider 
metamorphosis” by way of migration patterns that can, to some extent, be linked to the 
event of enslavement and the consequences of the economy which it produced. As 
Holland elaborates, “These bodies pass into a new self. To be defined – in both destiny 
and legal language – by their captors” (47). It is our task, then, to imagine our way 
beyond the definitions of the captors in order to trouble the dominant historiographical 
discourse of enslavement. 
 Furthermore, Harris’s idea of a “phantom limb” becomes a useful way to 
articulate historical elements that are felt in their absence. This phantom limb works to 
remind us, then, that “the re-assembly of dismembered man or god – possesses 
archetypical resonances – that embrace Egyptian Osiris, the resurrected Christ, and the 
many-armed deity of India” (Harris, 158). The fact that Western-sanctioned history does 
not adequately accommodate the medley of re-assembled subjects who manifest the 
limbo imagination leaves us, in our interrogation, with our own phantom limb. It also 
helps answer the question of how we can get at a poetics of feeling history that breaks 
open the potential for recognizing the voids in the archive. Since this project is my own 
attempt at intervention, this phantom limb, this embodied feeling of lack, brings me to my 
central argument, which frames empathy as a way of feeling history that generates the 
possibility and potential of a more ethical way of being. However, since history as a 
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discipline is symptomatic of this lack, in order to gesture towards the poetics of feeling 
history, it is necessary to engage the kinds of creative interventions that remind us of our 
shared phantom limb in the first place.  
 Elizabeth Freeman’s “Turn the Beat Around: Sadomasochism, Temporality, 
History,” is another richly layered suggestion of the ways in which we can gesture 
towards feeling the trauma of enslavement, despite our distance from such experiences. 
Freeman writes, 
  S/M might be a way of feeling historical that exposes the limits of   
  bourgeois-sentimental emotional reactions to historical events. Yet it also  
  refuses to eschew feelings altogether as a mode of knowledge. In other  
  words, S/M, as affect corporealized, rings some changes on what it might  
  mean to theorize historical consciousness – a slippery concept, but one  
  that [she takes] to mean both a latitudinal understanding of individual  
  experience as part of a contingent set of institutional structures…and a  
  longitudinal way of connecting that experience to those in a collective past 
  or future, albeit in a relationship other than simple cause and effect (40). 
While S/M does not become a central analytical trope in my project, it becomes useful as 
a way to situate the importance of feeling history, and empathy, by way of a physical 
imagining. Additionally, Freeman’s articulation of S/M is a site from which to gain a 
more nuanced perspective on the “terror and pleasure” marked by Venus’s presence in 
the archive (Hartman, 1). 
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Part II. Bearing Witness and Being-With: Deconstructing Empathy 
 Before delving into Beloved and Brief Wondrous Life, however, we must further 
articulate some of the language and theoretical underpinnings that make it possible to 
communicate the value and role of empathy in the potential for more ethical modes of 
being-in-the-world and relating to each other. The problem with presenting empathy as 
an avenue with which to approach a poetics of feeling history, emerges from the tacit 
implication that in order to empathize, one must be able to occupy, and metaphysically 
and transparently know, the body and consciousness of another. Because deconstruction’s 
aim works to highlight and do away with the binary and metaphysical ideology that tries 
to “ground” discourse, it is also the precise lens through which we might undo this notion 
of empathy. In fact, as James Clifford points out, “Feeling historical can be like a rug 
pulled out: a gestalt change perhaps, or a sense of sudden relocation, of being seen from 
some previously hidden perspective” (420). It is this characteristic of feeling historical – 
the “gestalt change” that allows us to see and be seen “from some previously hidden 
perspective” – which helps reframe empathy as itself ethical.  
The theoretical models of Jacques Derrida and Jean-luc Nancy offer useful tools 
with which to situate empathy as an avenue toward the poetics of feeling history insofar 
as these models help highlight the relationship between empathy and history by 
establishing the conditions of how our being-in-the-world is necessarily mediated by 
others’ being-in-the-world. Nancy’s assertion that any discourse relating to the “nature, 
essence, or end of ‘man’ must be undone,” not only echoes Glissant’s call for the 
decentering of Western man, but also begins to do the work of dismantling by presenting 
an alternate, and arguably - more ethical - notion of what it means to “be” (Being 
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Singular Plural xi). For Nancy, being is necessarily dependent on the other. Nancy 
writes,  
 There is no other meaning than the meaning of circulation. But this  
  circulation goes in all directions at once, in all the directions of all the  
  space-times (les espace-temps) opened by presence to presence: all things, 
  all beings, all entities, everything past and future, alive, dead, inanimate,  
  stones, plants, nails, gods – and “humans,” – that is, those who expose  
  sharing and circulation as such by saying “we,” by saying we to   
  themselves in all possible senses of that expression, and by saying we for  
  the totality of all being. (3) 
In other words, for Nancy, to be is to mean, and in order to mean, meaning has to be 
made between beings. Without this “between” movement, neither being nor meaning 
could be. In short, “Existence is with: otherwise nothing exists” (4). Moreover, being, as 
Nancy understands it, is both singular and plural: 
  Circulation – or eternity – goes in all directions, but it moves only insofar  
  as it goes from one point to another; spacing is its absolute condition.  
  From place to place, and from moment to moment, without any   
  progression or linear path, bit by bit and case by case, essentially   
  accidental, it is singular and plural in its very principle. It does not have a  
  final fulfillment any more than it has a point of origin. It is the originary  
  plurality of origins and the creation of the world in each singularity,  
  creation continued in the discontinuity of its discrete occurrences. (5) 
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In The Fragmentary Demand, Ian James further illuminates Nancy’s notion of “being-
with”: 
Nancy’s use of the term “being-with” seeks to think our worldly existence 
with others in a more fundamental or originary manner. Here the ‘being-
there’ of being-in-the-world can occur only on the basis of a relation with 
death which is (always) already shared, such that the being if the world 
itself is given or opened up as a primary being-with, which only 
subsequently allows for individuation or the singularizing of being-there. 
(104) 
If we can understand our existence in the way that Nancy articulates it above, then it 
becomes possible to understand how vital empathy is in the context of a more ethical 
being-with, insofar as empathy as an affect is dependent upon sharing. According to the 
British and World English Oxford Dictionary, empathy is “the ability to understand and 
share the feelings of another.” The word’s etymology is cited as coming from the “early 
20th century: Greek empatheia (from em- 'in' + pathos 'feeling') translating German 
Einfühlung.”  
 A deconstructive approach to this definition allows us to formulate empathy as a 
feeling that emanates both inwardly and outwardly: a “being-in-feeling” with and on 
behalf of an-other. If I can share a feeling, I require a subject with whom to share feeling. 
The dialectical movement of empathy is then necessarily imagined on individual terms, 
but also on the terms of the other. Empathy, in its most ethical sense, requires the 
cognition of another’s irrefutable difference from oneself. In order to empathize, an 
individual requires a certain kind of awareness about his or her own feelings regarding an 
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experience or event, and also the ways in which an-other might feel the experience or 
event, thus facilitating an ethical relationship. While some deconstructive scholars might 
argue that empathy requires identification, in fact, empathy cannot simply be a form of 
identification inasmuch as identification, as it is traditionally understood, emerges from 
representational language that perpetuates the essentialist notion that individuals are able 
to “know” another’s experience of being-in-the-world. Therefore, a deconstructed 
empathy does not necessarily require this kind of metaphysical “knowing” and 
identification. In contrast, identification could function as a subject’s recognition of the 
“certainty” (however nebulous) that s/he can never fully capture, fully comprehend, or 
inhabit another’s understanding of their being-in-the-world by virtue of its impossibility. 
 Imbricated within the understanding that we can never arrive at another being’s 
experience, is Derrida’s formulation of bearing witness, which is pertinent to my project 
insofar as it foregrounds the ethical terms of communicating an experience or event. For 
us, then, Derrida’s bearing witness is the analytical concept that guides our approach to 
creative interventions like Beloved and The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao. In a 
chapter from Sovereignties in Question entitled “Poetics and Politics of Witnessing, 
Derrida writes, “all responsible witnessing engages a poetic experience of language” 
(66). It is important to note, that for Derrida, the act of responsibly bearing witness to 
something, or of offering testimony in regard to something, cannot involve a guarantee of 
certainty. Indeed, 
  …as soon as it is guaranteed, certain as a theoretical proof, a testimony  
  can no longer be guaranteed as testimony. For it to be guaranteed as  
 17 
  testimony, it cannot, it must not, be absolutely certain, absolutely sure and  
  certain in the order of knowing as such. (68) 
The reason that testimony cannot be presented as certain is because bearing witness is 
mediated by a subject’s consciousness (and hence language), which is always-already 
mediated by the biases that emerge from said subject’s linguistic engagement. That is, 
since subjectivity “involves a profound entangling of being, language, and world,” then 
there is no way to guarantee that that which I am bearing witness to, (but am not – in 
actuality – bearing witness to at that particular moment) is what actually happened 
(Luszczynska, 69). Instead, responsible bearing witness is predicated upon an act of faith 
in which  
  I affirm (rightly or wrongly, but in all good faith, sincerely) that that was  
  or is present to me, in space and time (thus, sense perceptible), and  
  although you do not have access to it, not the same access, you, my  
  addressees, you have to believe me, because I engage myself to tell you the 
  truth, I am already engaged in it, I tell you that I am telling you the truth.  
  Believe me. You have to believe me. (Derrida, 76) 
By way of the constitutive element of faith, Derrida’s conceptualization of bearing 
witness has to do with being-with inasmuch as there is an exchange between the subject 
who bears witness and the subject to whom it is being told. In order to bear witness, then, 
one necessarily has to be-with. To be is necessarily to bear witness. We cannot not bear 
witness. We must bear witness. Also significant to our project is that “bearing witness is 
not through and through and necessarily discursive. It is sometimes silent. It has to 
engage something of the body, which has no right to speak” (77). It would not be a 
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tremendous interpretive leap to read this “body, which has no right to speak” in two 
ways. First, we can frame the act of bearing witness, as something that happens through 
“the body, which has (had) no right to speak.” In this sense, bearing witness can be 
understood in the context of enslaved bodies, which were not deemed to have the right to 
speak. Second, we can also read “the body, which has no right to speak” as the body 
which finds itself paralyzed to bear witness to the trauma of enslavement because of that 
body’s perceived distance (both temporally and physically) from the lived experiences of 
the enslaved.   
 The theoretical intersections of deconstruction, historiography, and post-
colonialism, and the potential of affective empathy that can emerge therein, are best 
examined through the lens of creative interventions that self-reflexively trouble the 
inherent problems in Western epistemology and which have become textual 
performances of alternate ways of being and knowing. If literature and imagination can 
be said to require empathy from readers, then their intersection serves as a site where we 
can find a glimmer of hope for more ethical, just, and “connected” ways of being. This 
kind of relationship making would mean that we understand what Nancy calls the 
“autistic multiplicity” of being (xiii). Although my notion of empathy is not the same as 
Nancy’s compassion, his articulation of compassion as a necessary aspect of being-with 
that is not “a pity that feels sorry for itself and feeds on itself” and is instead “the 
contagion, the contact of being with one another in this turmoil” gestures towards the 
kind of affective empathy that I posit holds the potential for more ethical being-withness 
(Being Singular Plural xii). If we can understand empathy in this sense, then there is 
something valuable about recursively, self-consciously trying to imagine what an-other 
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experiences. Empathy, then, can be understood as a vehicle for facilitating a self-
conscious, worked at, and worked through being-with. 
 Toni Morrison’s Beloved, originally published in 1987, is one example of such a 
text. Winner of both the Pulitzer and Noble Prizes, and named “The Single Best Work of 
American Fiction Published in the Last 25 Years” by the New York Times Book Review’s 
Fiction Survey, Beloved has transcended the realm of African American literature and 
become part of a more collective American literary and cultural psyche. Because of its 
canonical presence, it might be argued that the novel’s hierarchical relationship to other 
examples of African American or US Latino Literature, works against the ethical 
imperatives of deconstruction and the empathetic potential therein. However, I would 
posit that Beloved’s presence within a Western literary canon that is becoming less and 
less homogenized, is precisely what makes it a creative intervention that has clearly 
affected cultural sensibilities in significant ways, and that helps us get at a poetics of 
feeling historical by way of empathy.  
 Junot Díaz’s The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao was published in 2007 to 
great critical acclaim, following the author’s celebrated collection of short fiction, Drown 
which appeared nearly 10 years prior. Like Morrison, a Pulitzer Prize and other stamps of 
approval from prominent literary critics, including Michiko Kakutani of The New York 
Times, have cemented Díaz’s reputation, and as such, The Brief Wondrous Life does 
weighty cultural work. In fact, as a tangible literary manifestation of the kind of linguistic 
hybridity championed by post-structural and post-colonial theorists, Brief Wondrous Life 
can also be said to function on behalf of a resistive discourse that problematizes, and 
interrogates the externally-imposed rigidities of normalizing and oppressive structures of 
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power. Like Beloved, the novel’s acclaim, which privileges it in the Western literary 
canon, might be said to undermine its redemptive potential, insofar as it bolsters the role 
of literary hierarchies. However, if we situate the novel’s role in a historically, socio-
culturally mediated literary tradition, I would suggest that Junot Díaz’s preface to his 
Pulitzer Prize winning novel, The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao, is another potent 
and necessary example of the kind of creative intervention that works to responsibly and 
effectively negotiate the space between recuperative story-telling, and a reconfiguration 
of the meaning of history on a lived experience. In so doing, I aim to locate the sites from 
which a more empathetic being-in-the-world might begin to emerge. 
 
Part III. Empathy, Absence, and Identification in Toni Morrison’s Beloved 
  
Creative interventions that engage the historiographical event of enslavement 
become sites from which we can imagine suffering. This is significant insofar as the act 
of imagining an-other suffer emerges from empathy, and can lead us toward consolation. 
It is important to keep in mind that imagination is key here precisely because it is the 
affective imaginative rupture that forces us – as readers, writers, and communicators – to 
use a linguistic ordering that is outside of representational language. This rupture can 
only function on the condition that “meaning” is being “made” via poetic language. 
Poetic language, setting, tone, form, style, etc. (pathos) generate the imaginative rupture 
that gives way to empathy. An ethical and deconstructive construction of empathy 
gestures towards the notion that meaning is contextually oriented and “being” is a 
necessarily singular plural event.  
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It is important to note that the role of affective empathy and its ethical 
implications in Beloved has been attended to by several critics, but Molly Abel Travis’s 
“Beyond Empathy: Narrative Distancing and Ethics in Toni Morrison’s Beloved and J.M. 
Coetzee’s Disgrace,” is well-aligned with my argument. Travis writes,  
 Most conventional arguments for the redemptive power and ethical  
  function of narrative literature point to literature’s ability to cultivate  
  humanity through the creation of an empathy that can serve as the   
  foundation for a multicultural ethics. This empathy, so the argument goes,  
  is created through the reader’s identification with the narrator and/or  
  characters in a process that allows us to transcend differences. However,  
  in considering the possibilities of narrative empathy, one finds no   
  guaranteed relationship between empathy and a socialized ethical   
  response. (232)   
I would like to point out, here, that Travis, as I do, counters the understanding of 
empathy’s ethical potential by way of the identification between a reader and a literary 
character. As I have argued, however, the kind of empathy this project imagines, does not 
find its roots in identification, but in the recognition of the limits and impossibility of 
identification. Moreover, because Travis finds no “guaranteed relationship between 
empathy and a socialized response,” she dismisses the ethical potential of affective 
empathy and argues instead,  
  that the most ethical act for literature is not the bridging of gaps through  
  the creation of empathy, but the articulation and keeping alive of   
  intractable ethical questions about the asymmetrical relationship between  
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  self and other…It is only through openness to alterity that there can be an  
  ethical relation. Without a relation to that which interrupts our   
  epistemological projects to contain the other, there would be no ethics.  
  (232).   
I agree with Travis’s claim that literature’s “most ethical act” is its ability to articulate 
and sustain the mode of questioning that interrogates and intervenes upon 
“epistemological projects” that “contain the other,” but I would add that the specific 
epistemological project, here, is history itself. Furthermore, while I also agree that 
empathy’s ethical role is not predicated upon the “bridging of gaps,” I would disagree 
that it has no ethical potential whatsoever, precisely because the kind of questioning that 
Travis suggests necessitates empathy. In other words, to be open to alterity and to sustain 
the “ethical questions” that allow us to intervene upon history requires a capacity to 
empathize. Aside from bolstering Hartman, Holland, and Glissant’s negotiations of the 
problem of history by an ethics of questioning, an ethical interrogation of history – as 
Travis has delineated – I argue, is necessarily motivated by the kind of empathy that does 
not emerge from identification. Rather, this empathetic relationality is based upon the 
recognition that identification cannot occur in any true or transparent way. Therefore, the 
kind of empathy that reading Beloved affords, is one that recognizes the limits of our 
inhabited physical body, and that requires us to do the difficult work of imagining the 
psychical and physical experience of enslavement, despite knowing that we can never 
fully arrive at that experience. In this way, Beloved is a powerful example of how poetic 
language allows us to ethically bear witness to a particular historiographical event.  
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One of the facets that makes Toni Morrison’s Beloved such a rich example of 
literature’s affective potential is the way in which the novel performs language’s inability 
to capture, write, and (re)present that which refuses meaning; that which Julia Kristeva 
would call “the abject”:2
 one of those violent, dark revolts of being, directed against a threat that 
 seems to emanate from an exorbitant outside or inside, ejected beyond 
 the scope of the possible, the tolerable, the thinkable. It lies there, quite 
 close, but it cannot be assimilated (Powers of Horror 2). 
  
Beloved is in many ways, Morrison’s intervention upon the archives of history. As 
Marilyn Sanders Mobley notes in “Memory, History and Meaning in Toni Morrison’s 
Beloved,” the “actual story upon which the novel is based in an 1855 newspaper account 
of a runaway slave from Kentucky named Margaret Garner,” who kills her child when 
she learns she will be forced back into captivity as a result of the Fugitive Slave Law. 
(193). By way of the novel, Morrison reconfigures Garner’s archival presence into that of 
Sethe, whose murdered child haunts 124 – the house where Sethe resided with her 
daughter Denver, and her mother-in-law, Baby Suggs. Sethe’s sons, Buglar and Howard, 
“had run away by the time they were thirteen years old” because of Beloved’s enraged 
haunting of the house (Morrison, 3).  
                                                        2 Julia Kristeva’s work is not a central lens of analysis in this project, but her articulation of abjection 
captures the difficulties of linguistically rendering the trauma of enslavement.  
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 Much of the critical work engaging Morrison’s novel recognizes and explores the 
intersections of history and narrative,3 which Beloved so centrally foregrounds. As 
Christopher Peterson notes in “Beloved’s Claim,” the novel, insofar as it engages a 
specific event in the historiography of the enslaved, “imagines a triumph over the 
Fugitive Slave Law4
 Also important is that Beloved not only thematizes the ethical implications of 
linguistic representation of the horrors of institutionalized enslavement, but its form does 
as well. This point becomes especially evident in last section of the Sethe, Denver, 
Beloved trifecta where it seems that Beloved – not quite a ghost, and not quite a living 
person, not quite a woman, and not quite a child – speaks. By way of Morrison’s brilliant 
talent, this entire section works to ethically write the unspeakable conditions of the 
Atlantic Slave Trade and its aftermath, while simultaneously underscoring the ways in 
which empathy is necessarily constitutive of being-with. Morrison writes,  
 that should caution readers against the almost unanimous 
characterization of Beloved as a novel of historical recovery rather than of historical 
invention” (553). For Peterson, Morrison’s negotiation of the material dimensions of 
enslavement with an imagined “alternate past,” is what allows the novel to be read as an 
ethical approach to the relationships between self and other.  
  I am Beloved and she is mine…how can I say things that are pictures      
  I am  not separate from her there is no place where I stop    her face is                                                          3 Hortense Spillers’s “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe,” a frequently cited critical piece on Beloved, considers 
the intersection of history and narrative, and analyzes how the economy of enslavement commodified 
maternal bodies and their relationship to their offspring.  4 Refer to Stephen Best and Saidiya Hartman’s “Fugitive Justice,” for a critical piece that addresses the 
material and legal conditions of enslavement and of calls for redress made by ex-slaves in abolitionist 
America. 
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  my own and I  want to be there in the place where her face is and to  
  be looking at it too    a  hot thing (248). 
The question posed about being able to say things which only convey meaning as images 
speaks to the way that the experiences of the enslaved were mediated (throughout the 
horrific journey from Africa to the New World and for long afterward) by a lack of 
communication between enslaved subjects and those who colonized them. Significantly, 
it is precisely by way of the colonizer(s) that enslaved subjects enter a public discourse in 
the first place. The fragmentary nature of Beloved’s section, conveyed by the extra 
distance between words on the page, makes the section even more complex. The spaces 
between phrases make it seem as though many people are speaking and experiencing this 
portion of the novel. The experiences and images are not Beloved’s alone, but those of 
the Africans that came before, and will continue to come, in the holds of ships.  
 This section is also punctuated with the phrase “a hot thing.” This “hot thing    the 
men without skin push them through with poles” stands in for the scalding iron used to 
brand slaves (248). The fact that it ruptures through the fragmented narrative several 
times further supports my suggestion that this section in the novel attempts to capture a 
very specific, yet universal (inasmuch as it was experienced by millions of enslaved 
persons, and inasmuch as we can imagine the pain of being branded)5
                                                        5 Elizabeth Freeman’s “Turn the Beat Around: Sadomasochism, Temporality, History” examines the way 
in which using a tool, such as a whip, might help further the way in which we can feel historical via S/M.  
, account of 
suffering during the Atlantic Slave Trade. The repetition of the phrase also simulates the 
movement of a branding iron – moving forward to brand a body, then retracting, then 
moving forward again to brand another.  
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 Also interesting is the way in which the white men are described. That they are 
described as “men without skin” seems to invert the hierarchically ordered understanding 
of “whiteness” as superior to blackness inasmuch as for Beloved, the white men are 
lacking; they are without skin (249). The affective work of this phrase is powerful. It 
dexterously reconfigures an entire literary (and socio-cultural) history’s understanding of 
skin color, and how/what it signifies. It brings to the forefront the strangeness of white 
skin in the eyes of someone who has never known whiteness as any kind of norm, and it 
also works to convey the inanity of placing value on a person by way of their skin color. 
That our skin color can determine some kind of material or economic worth, in this 
example, seems so ludicrous, so asinine, that it brings into question the entire validity of 
historical narratives of enslavement that make meaning based on binary oppositions. In 
this sense, this phrase is in itself a fascinating example of the ways in which fiction can 
intervene on dominant discourses, and literally turn the oppressive ideologies that lie 
therein on their heads.  
 Another aspect of this section that demands consideration in light of its unique 
form is when Morrison writes, 
  All of it is now    it is always now    there will never be a time when I am  
  not crouching and watching others who are crouching too    I am always  
  crouching. (248) 
This moment in the section can be said to speak to the spatial-temporality of enslavement 
and to the fact that its institutionalization has left deep fissures in our current 
sociocultural moment in time. Morrison articulates a black cultural sensibility, which 
symbolizes the systemic violence of enslavement, but also the systemic racism that limits 
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and encroaches upon the freedom of black communities today. We can see direct 
evidence of the vestiges of slavery and its attendant racism as they are made manifest in 
very particular spaces in cities across the US.  
 Additionally, Morrison’s writing and rewriting of “I am always crouching” 
reminds us of our shared phantom limb and the limbo imagination of enslaved subjects 
articulated by Wilson Harris: 
  Limbo then reflects a certain kind of gateway to or threshold of a new  
  world and the dislocation of a chain of mile. It is – in some ways – the  
  archetypal seachange stemming from Old Worlds and it is legitimate, I  
  feel, to pun on limbo as a kind of shared phantom limb (4). 
The notion of limbo as a dance that requires a backwards crouching that is ever forcing us 
closer to the ground by limiting the literal space within which to negotiate our bodies is 
not only reminiscent of the physical lack of space that the enslaved were subjected to in 
the holds of ships, but also to the social constrictions that were - and are - imposed on 
African American peoples by a system of oppression that maintains binary oppositions by 
way of representational language. The connotations of limbo as a space that is in-
between, that is neither here nor there, are also indicative of a very particular way of 
experiencing and understanding being-in-the-world, which cannot be easily assimilated 
by representational language. As such, it can be argued that it is precisely this limbo 
imagination that affords a space from which ethical creative interventions can emerge. 
The metaphor of a limbo pole being lowered towards the ground that forces a physical 
body to maneuver and negotiate the space left to it, becomes an extremely poignant one 
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in relation to the kinds of texts that materialize out of a consciousness that is mediated by 
oppressive structures of power.  
 The entire section where Beloved speaks is marked by a sense of disorientation 
and a cyclical, infinite temporality. This kind of non-linear temporal conception speaks to 
the imbricated, repetitious, and ultimately non-metaphysical understanding of past 
experiences. It speaks to the palimpsest of being and to the way that historical events are 
not relegated to the past, but always-already occurring and affecting, and gesturing 
towards a future. Morrison’s dazzling constructions of phrases and images manage to 
situate Beloved, and those she represents, in all places at all times. This is particularly 
evident if we look at moments in the text that are constructed in a way that gestures 
towards something without arrival. If we understand desire as perpetual non-arrival, then 
it follows to say that the entire section is wholly focused on a consistent, all-consuming 
desire for presence, recognition, and autonomy. For example, when Morrison writes, 
“when he dies on my face I can see hers she is going to smile at me    she is going to     
her sharp earrings are gone,” Beloved demonstrates an urge to be recognized by way of 
“her” (Sethe’s) smile (250). Sethe’s smile, as it would be both for and toward Beloved, 
can manifest only by way of recognition.6
 Arguably, this longing to be smiled at speaks to a significant particularity of the 
human condition insofar as the urge to be recognized is, ultimately, the urge towards 
understanding one’s own being or existence as it relies on being acknowledged by the 
other (Hegel, 631). The smile that Beloved so desires is dependent upon the empathetic 
  
                                                        6 In “The Bonds of Love and the Boundaries of Self in Toni Morrison’s Beloved,” Barbara A. Schapiro 
takes a psychoanalytical approach to the notion of how being is necessarily mediated by an-other. 
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relationality of being. The phrase is repeated though, “she is going to smile at me she is 
going to” and then after a break, “her sharp earrings are gone.” The repetition not only 
builds the anticipation of being recognized, but since it is constructed in the present 
continuous tense, as an event that is presently on the verge of occurring, and will 
continue to recur in the future but does not come to be, (“her sharp earrings are gone”) 
becomes a literal textual performance of the “violent relatedness” of being (Morrison, 
250, BSP, xii). The phrase repeats throughout the entire section of the novel and 
Morrison’s use of tense and repetition, and the way that usage generates a feeling of 
continual anticipation also echoes the anticipation that emerges from the temporal space 
that arises immediately after slavery was abolished - especially as it encapsulates a 
moment in time that anticipates a more just and hopeful future that cannot manifest as 
long as the residual hierarchical understandings of race still operate within a particular 
dominant discourse. 
 The linguistic play that Morrison engages imbues the segment with the singular 
plurality of being. When Beloved says that she “want[s] the join” – which implies that 
there is a distance to bridge – it seems as though she is speaking for all of the enslaved 
whose rights to peace and belongingness were viscerally and violently ignored by those 
who perpetuated the commodification of bodies and suffering during the trans-Atlantic 
Slave Trade (252). As the section closes, Morrison writes,  
  Sethe sees me see her and I see the smile     her smiling face is the place  
  for me     it is the face I lost     she is my face smiling at me     doing it at  
  last     a hot thing     now we can join     a hot thing (252). 
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This “wanting to join,” demands close attention if we consider it as exemplary of “being” 
in the non-representational sense. That is, in this section, the desire to join can be 
understood as the desire to recognize one’s selfhood as constitutive of the other. Beloved 
cannot be – or at least, feel like she is – without joining Sethe. That Sethe is the maternal 
body that brings Beloved to physical being is not to be ignored, and while it highlights 
our very literal requirement of an-other in order “be,” Beloved’s desire to join, to come 
together with Sethe, seems to most poignantly articulate the radical opportunity for 
empathetic relationality that alternate ways of knowing can afford us. And even within 
the textual representations of the non-representational, when Sethe smiles at Beloved at 
last, when she and Beloved are allowed the merge, the violent relatedness of being is still 
being punctuated by the hot thing; the literal and figurative marker of enslaved bodies, of 
their worth, and of their status within an oppressive, radically not-with (thus radically un-
ethical), structure of power.  
 This sense of a separate-togetherness lends itself well to a reading of Beloved’s 
section as a kind of pre-discursive, extra-linguistic temporality. I would suggest that this 
section also signifies the moments of Beloved’s conception, her birth, her death, her 
phase as a disembodied ghost, and her rebirth as an embodied one. Morrison writes, 
  my face is coming     I have to have it     I am looking for the join     I am  
  loving my face so much      my dark face is close to me     I want to join      
  she whispers to me     she whispers     I reach for her     chewing and  
  swallowing     she touches me     she knows I want to join     she chews  
  and swallows me     I am gone     now I am her face     my own face has  
  left me….I want to be the two of us. (252) 
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I would suggest that these fragments coalesce to represent the laborious process of 
birthing a child. It is as though Beloved is putting words to the challenge of being born, 
of coming to be in the world as a physical body with no choice but to exist. The phrases 
work to articulate the movement of straining towards. Like the trauma of being 
constricted by bodies and the hull of a ship during the transportation of the enslaved, only 
to arrive in a New World, which requires an entire reconfiguration of “being-in-the-
world,” the trauma of being born is also mediated by a constricted passage. Coming into 
the world all screams, placenta, and helplessness, becomes an apt metaphor for the 
condition of enslaved subjects emerging from the holds of ships covered in filth, tears, 
and without a foothold in the New World.  
 This reading becomes possible insofar as the temporality in this portion of the 
novel is not only non-linear, but always already. Since this section can be said to function 
outside any and all conceptualizations of “time,” as such, we can understand 
“temporality” here as an all-encompassing sub-consciousness. This trajectory is 
significant to follow because it affords a reading of Beloved as representative of 
something so outside of “reason,” that it cannot be understood or mediated by way of 
language (read: logic and linearity) at all. Although this extra-discursive condition is 
expressed textually via language – because language is, after all, constitutive of 
“meaning,” however inadequate the ability to signify may be – the section’s form makes 
meaning by way of pictures. These flashes of experience are meaning-full because they 
do not bear witness to the trauma of enslavement as what it is (that which refuses to be 
signified) but as what it feels like. The abjection of being transported in the filth and 
misery of a slave ship’s hold makes signification impossible, but by presenting flashes of 
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that abjection, there is a sense of understanding - a trace - of what the transportation of 
the enslaved did to bodies.  
 For example, Morrison does not write, “some of the enslaved ate their own fecal 
matter for sustenance.” This kind of writing connotes a record of observation, of telling 
what “really happened” by way of gathering data, and representing it to readers as a kind 
of final signifier. Instead, Morrison writes “some who eat nasty themselves” (248). This 
phrasing eludes immediate understanding and brings to light the almost inconceivable 
conditions of despair in the holds of slave ships. By way of this section though, we are 
forced to conceive it. Despite the seemingly endless space between “us” and “them,” 
between “then” and “now,” we are forced to imagine the scene, and by way of imagining 
it, we – in some sense – feel it. And however inadequate or inaccurate this imagining may 
be, it brings us closer to understanding that we are responsible for and deserving of a 
collective consolation by simple virtue of the fact that without the event of enslavement, 
we would not hold this text in our hands. It is by way of being exposed to language that 
does not try to fix meaning and instead works to perform the slippery nature of 
signification, that readers can begin to re-understand the way experiences are singularly 
nuanced, yet able to be felt – in some way – as a collective condition of being. This re-
understanding of relationality and being surfaces from the empathetic affect which novels 
that challenge Western epistemology can generate and demands that we sustain the ethics 
of interrogating history. 
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Part IV. Empathy, Mediation, and Bearing Witness in The Brief Wondrous Life of 
Oscar Wao 
 
Like Beloved, Brief Wondrous Life is a novel brimming with the potential of 
deconstructive ethics insofar as it also works to cultivate affective empathy. Differently, 
from Beloved, however, Brief Wondrous Life employs language that is more indicative of 
an more urban community, which is itself constituted by difference (both cultural and 
linguistic), and by the diverse influences of immigrants and “minority” populations. 7
 Derrida claims that all responsible witnessing must involve a poetic 
 experience of language. When I bear witness to you, a vow or an oath is 
 always implied: you have to believe me. The “to you” of any 
 communication or relation must simultaneously be a promise. All relation 
 is based upon this extra-discursive event that happens within language as a 
 pledge…Rather than a simultaneous or coexistent being and being-with, 
 Derrida maintains that I am and can only be after having been in a way of 
 responsibility to the other (69). 
 
One of the more significant questions that emerge from the analytical intersections of 
deconstructive ethics, history, and empathy is the way in which Díaz’s novel speaks to 
the problems of ethically bearing witness to history. In The Ethics of Community, Ana 
Luszczynska reminds us of Derrida’s notion of bearing witness: 
The idea that being is mediated by our responsibility to the other means that being 
necessarily requires an empathetic (and thus ethical) relationality, which might manifest 
                                                        7 Ramon Saldivar’s “Historical Fantasy, Speculative Realism, and Postrace Aesthetics in Contemporary 
American Fiction,” argues for a different literary term (“historical fantasy”) to accommodate Brief 
Wondrous Life’s stylistic medley and the way in which it manifests a new kind of historiography.   
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by way of reading historiographical novels. Brief Wondrous Life allows us closer 
proximity to the ethics of bearing witness by way of the novel’s narrator, the novel’s 
form, and the various stylistic elements that tell Oscar’s (and our) story. 
 Díaz’s novel traces the historically mediated trajectory of Oscar Wao, a young, 
Dominica, science fiction8
We are given the story of The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao by way of 
Yunior, the novel’s “sole narrator,” who “establishes a link between storytelling and 
 fanatic who by sophomore year “found himself weighing in at 
a whopping 245 (260 when he was depressed, which was often)” (19). Oscar had always 
been a “young nerd,” a “social introvert who trembled with fear during gym class,” and 
“who was always hiding out in the library” (20, 21, 22). In fact, Oscar “couldn’t have 
passed for Normal if he’d wanted to” (21). Oscar’s naïve and overly romanticized 
approach to falling in love, what Díaz writes as “the gravitational mass of love, fear, 
longing, desire, and lust that he directed toward any girl in the vicinity…broke his heart 
every day” (23). As the son of Belicia Cabral, once a nexus of sheer will and a “cuerpazo 
so berserk that only a pornographer or a comic-book artist could have designed it with a 
clear conscience,” and later physically and psychologically diminished by years of single 
motherhood, a life of hard work in diaspora, and ravaged by cancer, Oscar’s romantic 
naïveté begins to make some sense (Díaz, 92). Díaz tracks the trajectory of Beli’s life in 
the DR beginning with her father, Abelard, and the demise he met at the hands of 
Trujillo, and ending with the consequences of Beli’s tendency to fall utterly and 
completely in love with men who had little respect for her.  
                                                        8 T.S. Miller’s “Preternatural Narration and the Lens of Genre Fiction in Junot Díaz The Brief Wondrous 
Life of Oscar Wao” and Daniel Bautista’s “Comic Book Realism: Form and Genre in Junot Díaz’s The 
Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao” are useful critical pieces which engage the novel’s engagement with 
science fiction more closely.  
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dictatorship” (Machado-Saez, 527). In “Dictating Desire, Dictating Diaspora: Junot 
Díaz’s The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao as Foundational Romance,” Elena 
Machado Saez notes that “by pulling back the veil of an omniscient voice and revealing 
Yunior as the narrator, Díaz underscores the dangers involved in accepting the 
authenticity of any historical narrative, even the fiction that he himself writes” (527). 
This point is pertinent to our analysis insofar as it frames the novel as the kind of 
historiographical work that manifests the kind of empathetic, and thus ethical trajectory 
of questioning and interrogation that serves to intervene upon the archives of history. 
Furthermore, Díaz says that Brief Wondrous Life is “not only a text… - it’s also a game. 
As a reader you have to put the book together in your head, but you could only do that by 
answering some important questions for yourself: why is Yunior telling THIS story?” 
(“The Yale Literary Magazine Interviews Junot Díaz,” 27). By presenting the novel as a 
game, as the kind of text that necessitates an interactive reading that is mediated by 
questions, Díaz presents it as a text that demands the deconstructive ethics and the 
empathy we are trying to inaugurate by way of this project.   
 In “‘Reassembling the Fragments’: Battling Historiographies, Caribbean Discourse, 
and Nerd Genres in Junot Díaz’s The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao,” Monica Hanna 
argues  
  that the novel strives for a “resistance history” which acts as an alternative 
  to traditional histories of the Dominican Republic by invoking a   
  multiplicity of narrative modes and genres. By incorporating genres like  
  magical realism and “nerd” genres that include comics and science fiction, 
  Díaz develops a historiography that shifts the narrative structure as well as 
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  the subject of history, allowing for a representation of national history that 
  is cognizant of its various, sometimes dissonant, elements. Yunior seeks to 
  present Dominican history in this way in order to resist the conformity and 
  univocality insisted upon by the national power structure best personified  
  by the figure of the Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo. (500) 
Hanna’s analysis of the novel is very much aligned with the theoretical and ethical 
perspectives that were delineated in the introduction, especially if we consider her point 
that the novel is – in some way – “cognizant” of history’s “various, sometimes dissonant, 
elements.” Hanna also argues, “Yunior struggles with the silences that pervade both the 
history of Oscar de Léon’s family and that of the Dominican Republic,” and the way he 
negotiates these silences is to adopt “several narrative frames” that examine the “story 
from multiple perspectives” (500). For Hanna, and for us, 
  it is this very multiplicity that becomes the cornerstone of Yunior’s  
  narrative and historiographic stance, allowing him to document and  
  reconstruct a history that is otherwise unrecoverable because of its official  
  nullification. (500) 
Echoing the problem of histories and historiography foregrounded in our introduction, 
Hanna rearticulates these issues and how they manifest in The Brief Wondrous Life of 
Oscar Wao. 
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In order to expand upon the historiographical negotiations of the novel, it is useful 
to consider Yunior’s preface to the novel, where the motifs of fukú and zafa are 
introduced and contextualized for readers:9
They say it came first from Africa, carried in the screams of the enslaved; 
that it was the death bane of the Tainos, uttered just as one world perished 
and another began; that it was a demon drawn into Creation through the 
nightmare door that was cracked open in the Antilles. Fukú americanus, or 
more colloquially, fukú  – generally a curse or doom of some kind; 
specifically the Curse and the Doom of the New World (Díaz 1). 
  
Fukú, then, can be understood as the curse of disenfranchisement that colonial 
imperatives have made manifest in Caribbean (and various other) spaces. For Díaz, fukú 
functions as the residue of the violations inherent in colonial initiatives, and its power can 
be wielded by both individuals and institutions. This articulation of fukú can be said to 
encapsulate the terror, violence, fragmentation, and violence of enslavement and its 
aftermath. Zafa, on the other hand, becomes a counterspell to the doom of fukú. By 
functioning as a kind of blessing that keeps ill wishes at bay, zafa is a powerful tool that 
can be used “in the hope that the bad luck will not have had time to cohere” (Díaz 7). 
These “superstitions,” as non-Western understandings of fate, luck, and destiny, are 
representative of the alternate ways of understanding the world that Díaz engages 
throughout the novel, and remind us the potency behind a rearticulation of myth as 
guiding tropes in historiographical projects.  
                                                        9 Find another reading of fukú as part of Diaz’s “decolonial theory,” in Jose David Saldivar’s “Conjectures 
on ‘Americanity’ and Junot Diaz’s ‘Fukú Americanus’ in The Brief Wondrous Life of Oscar Wao” 
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 Beli’s “lost years” can function as another apt example of language’s slippery 
nature. Before coming to live with La Inca “[Beli] had lived with another foster family, 
monstrous people if the rumors are to be believed, a dark period in her life neither she nor 
her madre ever referenced. Their very own pagína en blanco” (Díaz 78).10
If I had to put it into words, I’d say what she wanted, more than anything, 
was what she always wanted throughout her Lost Childhood: to escape. 
From what was easy to enumerate: the bakery, her school, dull-ass Bani, 
sharing a bed with her madre, the inability to buy the dresses she wanted, 
having to wait until fifteen to straighten her hair, the impossible 
expectations of La Inca, the fact that her long-gone parents had died when 
she was one, the whispers that Trujillo had done it, those first years of her 
life when she’d been an orphan, the horrible scars from that time, her own 
despised black skin. (80, emphasis mine) 
 If we follow 
this vein, then we see how Beli’s condition of being-in-the-world is always mediated by 
an urge to escape and by the years she lost. Díaz writes,  
Beyond providing an example of Díaz’s (and Yunior’s) recognition of the problem of 
putting experiences and feelings into words, this excerpt also demonstrates how language 
constitutes our being-in-the-world, as well as our relationship to the other and to 
                                                        10 The motif of blank pages is significant throughout the novel. And references to the blank pages seem to 
manifest in sites where the suffering being described in the novel is almost beyond the realm of even 
imaginative or poetic signification. However, despite the difficulty of linguistically rendering the violent 
infliction of pain against another being, I would suggest that the motif of the blank pages gestures towards 
language’s inadequacy. In Specters of the Atlantic, Ian Baucom explores Granville Sharp’s account of the 
massacre aboard the slave ship, Zong. The manuscript’s 133 pages and the blank pages/spaces Baucom 
finds therein, “figures the emergence of the oppositional ‘melancholy realism’ that dominates the 
representational logic of almost all the subsequent works which have attempted to offer their testimony to 
the truth of this event” (133).  
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ourselves. The excerpt also points to the structures of power from which we are trying to 
escape. Beli’s obligations to La Inca, as a bakery employee and student, as well as the 
simultaneously self and externally-imposed obligations that compel her to buy particular 
kinds of dresses, and to want to straighten her hair – yet another way of reinforcing the 
aesthetic values of the colonizers – and her lack of family, a “normalizing” institution in 
and of itself – all worked Beli to mold her into a particular kind of person: one whose 
ambition and potential seem at odds with one another, and whose general sense of well-
being and peace of mind were precluded by the limitations that language sets forth. The 
fact that neither La Inca nor Beli spoke about the Lost Years is indicative of the way in 
which language makes memory seem closer than it does when experienced non-verbally. 
 Beli and La Inca also seem to recognize that language mediates their being-with 
and that poetic language, spoken purposefully, in good faith, and with the aim of bringing 
about a communal goal that necessarily requires the recognition of being-with. An 
example of this can be found in the novel when Beli disappears after her affair with the 
Gangster. Of La Inca’s “divine” act of prayer, Díaz writes,  “In no time at all the room 
was filled with the faithful and pulsed with a spirit so dense that it was the rumored that 
the Devil himself had to avoid the Sur afterward for months” (145). This coming together 
– even within the realm of what can be said to be the Western, metaphysical discourse of 
Catholicism (and the numerous implications that lie therein) – is predicated upon a sense 
of empathy and being-with. That is, in order for these women to come together in prayer, 
and as Díaz points out, who “suffered shetaat (spiritual burnout),” then they had to be 
motivated to do so from a mutual sense of being-with, a mutual recognition of their 
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shared place within a socio-political structure that works only on behalf of itself and 
against the needs and well-being of others (145).  
 In “The Moral Obligations of Living in a Democratic Society” Cornel West 
speaks towards an active empathy when he writes, “Empathy is not simply a matter of 
trying to imagine what others are going through, but having the will to muster up the 
courage to do something about it. In a way empathy is predicated upon hope” (127). 
West’s articulation of empathy demonstrates that it indeed requires something of us. In 
other words, empathy requires us to do something on behalf of others because inasmuch 
as we are for others, we are simultaneously “taking care” of ourselves. We feel empathy, 
we recognize it as an affect or feeling, and in the space of that recognition it motivates us 
to will it into ethical being. In this sense, empathy is more than a feat of imagination, it is 
also an action; a way of being that is based on a motivation to engage with others by way 
of an ethical questioning that allows to feel our proximity or distance from said other. 
The ways in which we bridge these spatial or temporal separations are necessarily ethical 
only inasmuch as we recognize the distance between ourselves and an-other, and try to 
mediate it by way of an ethical interrogation. 
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